In issue 19, “A Look on Brazil” discusses the recent polemics spun by the press’s speculation of a third term for President Lula, the opposition against Brazil’s tax on checks (CPMF) and against public TV Brasil, the rulings by the Higher Electoral Court (party loyalty, civil servants’ right to strike and financial contributions to political parties), the election to the Workers’ Party national board and the withdrawal of the Communist Party of Brazil from the Single Central of Workers (CUT).


Every two years Brazil’s political calendar establishes elections. In 2008, there will be municipal elections. In 2010, there will be general elections: the President of the Republic will be chosen, as well as two-thirds of the Senate, the entire Chamber of Deputies, all the 27 state governors and the respective 27 state legislatures.

The 2010 presidential election brings a novelty. For the first time since 1989, Lula’s name will not be among the alternatives.

The incumbent president of the Republic is impeded by law to be a candidate for a third term of office in 2010 (though he may run again in 2014). Yet he will undoubtedly have tremendous influence on his own succession.

The rightist opposition believes that, without Lula as a contender, it will win the next presidential elections. Many of the parties that compose the ruling coalition believe that, without Lula, the Workers’ Party (PT) will be forced to support a presidential candidate from another party.

The PT approved, in its 3rd Congress, a resolution providing for the launching of its own candidate to the presidency of the Republic. Yet part of the big media doubts this decision. Just recently, it said that the PT would be led to support a candidate from another party. In late October, early November, the big media embraced another thesis: one that the PT might decide to back a constitutional amendment that would allow Lula to run for a third term in 2010.

The speculation by the big media was based on one fact: some federal legislators submitted a proposal that would confer upon the president of the Republic the right to directly call referendums, without passing through Congress. One representative gave, as an example of the kind of referendum that might be called, one that would alter the Constitution and allow Lula to run for a third term.

The proposal was rejected by a broad political spectrum ranging from the right-wing opposition to the left-wing including the PT and Lula himself. But the fact that the proposal exists and counts among its supporters with a PT federal representative generated a wave of speculations about which indeed was the Workers’ Party position.

The third term proposal was rejected for several reasons.

Firstly because to pass this constitutional amendment would demand a tremendous mobilization, which would prompt the radicalization of the political dispute in the country, an initiative that does not suit the moderate line adopted by the Lula government in 2003.

Secondly because the PT and Lula opposed passing legislation regarding the reelection during the FHC administration, condemning among other things changing the rules ‘in the middle of the game’.

Thirdly, the PT has an interest in calling an ad hoc Constitutional Assembly to pass a political reform. In this context, the proposal for a third term belittles the proposal for a Constitutional Assembly and makes it look casuistic.

In the fourth place, defending a third term for Lula gives the impression that the PT finds it that, without Lula, it is doomed –an impression that only helps the PSDB.

On account of these and other motives, state representative Rui Falcão stated that “the offer of a third consecutive term for President Lula, handed over on a tray by two ruling coalition representatives on the day of his 62nd birthday, was truly a Trojan horse”.

The lawmaker adds that “should a political reform occur, President Lula is in favor of the end of reelection, with the establishment thereafter of a five-year term for presidents, governors, and mayors”.

The polemic surrounding the third term has only gained momentum because, after nearly five years in government, President Lula exhibits high approval ratings, around 60 percent. Still, as recalled by state representative Rui Falcão, who presided over the PT in 1994, “the continuity of the popular-democratic program of the Lula government and the upholding of the programmatic commitments made by the PT and its allied parties may be equally ensured by means of a PT own candidate or from one of the allied parties, sustained by the people and supported by a coalition. No doubt that Lula’s support, given his leadership, charisma and popularity, as well as the achievements of the Workers’ Party government will play a crucial role in the 2010 succession”.

The proposal for a third term for Lula ultimately served as a pretext for the opposition forces to toughen the negotiation regarding the extension of the Provisional Contribution on Financial Movement (CPMF), a tax deemed essential for accomplishing the federal government’s targets.

The CPMF was approved during the FHC administration and was fiercely criticized by the PT at the time. The opposition of the PT to the CPMF, at that time, is being greatly exploited by the press, which recklessly fails to report that –even then—a significant share of the Workers’ Party was in favor of approving the levy.

Today, the CPMF represents an important source of income for the government. Not approving it, as intended by the PSDB, would undermine the foundations of several governmental policies.

The government made a great effort to convince the PSDB of the importance for the country, and even for the government/opposition relations and for the next president of the Republic, of approving the CPMF.

Yet as now what has prevailed in the PSDB’s position is the adversarial bias of the opposition party. Even without the PSDB votes the government believes it will win in the Senate voting, due in mid-November.

Another theme being debated in Congress is the creation by provisional measure 398/07 of Brazil’s public television broadcasting company, the Empresa Brasil de Comunicação (EBC), or TV Brasil.

TV Brasil is to start digital transmission of its programming to São Paulo on December 2. The signal will be open, on a channel presently being defined. The same programming will also be transmitted to São Paulo through an analog signal, the same technology that will be used by TV Brasil transmissions to the states of Rio de Janeiro and Maranhão, in addition to the Federal District.

For beyond the divergences regarding the themes being considered in Congress, it is plain to see that polarization is intensifying, as we get closer to the 2008 municipal elections.

Such polarization, compounded by the Legislative Branch’s structural shortcomings, has generated deadlocks that have served as a pretext for Brazil’s highest courts of justice to usurp prerogatives of the lawmakers.

Three of the most recent examples thereof were the judicial decisions on party loyalty, the public employees’ right to strike, and contributions to political parties.

The resolution by the Electoral Higher Court (TSE) on the contributions by government officials and those occupying managerial positions, published on October 16, simply prohibits political parties from receiving donations or contributions from “authorities” occupying non-tenured positions in the direct or indirect public administration.

Included in said prohibition are Ministers, city and state secretaries, and presidents, heads or senior managers of companies directly or indirectly subordinated to the public administration (including autarchies), and all civil servants who hold non-tenured offices in “top and middle management functions”.

Public employees who “execute” the decisions are not included, but those who practice deeds that “bring in themselves a decision, and not the mere execution”.

Such resolution does not affect those elected for terms of office; thus, contributions or donations made by affiliated parliamentarians and other elected office holders are permitted.

As of the date of the publication of the new Resolution #22,585, party locals and chapters must adapt to the new rules, excluding from the list of donors and from statutory contributions, affiliated members holding non-tenured offices.

As of the publication date, should any party chapter or local receive direct deposits in their bank accounts of donations or contributions by affiliated members who do not comply with the TSE’s regulation, they should return such values via refund, check or bank transfer, entering the operation with the corresponding documentation, which is to be annexed to the accounting statements that are to be filed in a following year with the Electoral Justice.

The new TSE resolution is based on an abusive interpretation of Law 9,096/95, which in its article 31, item II, prohibits public office holders from contributing (directly or indirectly, including advertising) to political parties.

The TSE interpretation is abusive because it disenfranchises citizens holding public offices from their individual rights to use their personal salaries to contribute to the political party they are affiliated with.

The TSE incurred in the absurdity of interpreting that public authorities cannot participate in the activities of their respective political party (be it understood, with the same rights and obligations of any other affiliated member), participation against which there is no legal or constitutional impediment whatsoever.

Why should these Brazilian citizens be impeded from fully exercising their political rights and from participating, including financially, in the activities of the political organizations of their preference?

Behind the TSE’s absurd ruling there lies the intention of harming the Workers’ Party, whose membership occupying non-tenured positions are statutorily obliged to contribute with the party finances.

As a condition to participate in partisan activities, the PT requires from every affiliated member an annual contribution. With the new TSE resolution, however, those with the greatest political responsibility will not be able to financially aid the party with which they are affiliated or that of their preference.

Such decision contradicts the constitutional principle providing for autonomy for political parties to define their internal structure, organization, and functioning.

It is against such backdrop that elections for the new Workers’ Party national board will take place. Of a nationwide scope, nine slates and seven candidates run for president (For a complete list, go to www.pt.org.br).

Next, a brief bio of the seven candidates, in alphabetical order according to first name:

Gilney Viana: aged 62. Socialist militant since 1961 and in the Workers’ Party since its founding in 1979. In 1968 he engaged in the armed resistance against the military dictatorship, having spent the 1970s as a political prisoner, only released on parole as a PT militant. He was state and federal representative (1995-2002); president of the PT Mato Grosso chapter and member of the PT National Board. He was Secretary for Sustainable development in the Lula administration Ministry of the Environment, from January 2003 to May 2007. Gilney is a medical doctor and professor at the Federal University of Mato Grosso.

José Eduardo Martins Cardozo, aged 48, is a federal representative. A lawyer, professor, and Attorney for the City of São Paulo, he was a São Paulo council member (1995-2003). He was elected federal representative in 2003 and reelected in 2006. Affiliated with the PT since 1980, he was a member of the Workers’ Party São Paulo State Board.

Jilmar Tatto, aged 42, is a federal representative. He was a state legislator from 1999 to 2004. He was elected federal representative in 2006. The incumbent Workers’ Party national third-vice-president, he was president of the São Paulo city chapter and municipal secretary for Food Supply, for Implementing Sub-prefectures, Transport, and Government in the Marta Suplicy São Paulo city administration, 2001-2004; Partner and director of Asteca company.

Jose Carlos Miranda, ex metalworker, a PT affiliate since 1981, he was CUT Secretary for the Greater São Paulo, founder and leader of the Metalworkers’ National Confederation. Member of the Workers’ Party São Paulo State Board. Member of the Socialist Black Movement (MNS). Leader of the Marxist Left tendency.

Markus Sokol, aged 53, is a member of the Workers’ Party National Board. He militates in tendency O Trabalho, the Brazilian section of the 4th International. When young, he participated in rallies in his school. He helped to rebuild the University of São Paulo Free Students’ Board. He contributed toward the construction of the Metalworkers’ Opposition in São Paulo. He was a delegate to the Single Central of Workers (CUT) Founding Congress. In the PT since its founding, he was National Secretary for Communication in the 1994 Lula presidential campaign. In 2004, he headed a petition with 15 thousand signatures for the Withdrawal of the Brazilian Troops from Haiti.

Ricardo Berzoini, aged 46, is a federal representative. He is a Bank of Brazil employee on leave and one of the PT founders, a party with which he has been affiliated since 1980. He was the Bank Workers’ Union communication secretary, secretary-general and president from 1994 to 1998. Berzoini was also the first CUT National Bankworkers’ Confederation president. He was minister of Social Security and, later on, of Labour and Employment in the Lula administration. In August 2005, he returned to Congress while simultaneously holding the Workers’ Party secretariat-general office. He was elected PT national president in 2005.

Valter Pomar, aged 41, has been the Workers’ Party International Relations Secretary since 2005. A graphic worker and historian, he started his political militancy in the late 1970s. Affiliated with the PT since 1985. In 1997 he was elected Workers’ Party national third-vice-president.

The new Workers’ Party national board, to be elected on 2 and 6 December 2007, will have among its tasks to prepare the conditions for the PT to run and win the 2010 presidential elections, a process which presupposes good party performance in the 2008 municipal elections. It will also be tasked with recomposing relations between the PT and its traditional leftist allies, among which the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), which decided to break with the Single Central of Workers and call a founding congress of a new central, which is to be called the Central of the Brazilian Workers.

As pointed out by journalist Pedro Pomar, “the imminent legalization of the trade union centrals prompted a surge of new entities and the reconfiguration of the existing arrangements in the ‘trade union superstructure’. It seems that the greatest stimulus for that lies in the possibility of access to a share of the revenues of the Trade Union Contribution (the former trade union tax), to which will be entitled all those centrals that come to be recognized as such by the government, once the representation requisites are fulfilled”.

The central backed by the PCdoB intends, according to Pomar, “to build on the structure of the Classist Trade Union Current (CSC), politically tied to the PCdoB, and with a significant participation in the CUT (16% of the delegates to the 2006 CUT Congress)”.

The CSC states it is leaving the CUT in protest against the “hegemonism” of the Trade Union Articulation (ArtSind), the main Workers’ Party current inside the CUT, which would be acting so as to “dam” the Communist current, that is, the CSC wants to grow inside the CUT and the ArtSind won’t let it. Moreover, there would be other reasons, as indirectly suggested, for their decision to leave the CUT: “the crisis in the labor movement”, “the crisis of the labor leadership”, and the “change with the Lula government”, among other reasons because “contained growth won’t solve” the unemployment problem. Wagner Gomes, a Communist and a CUT vice-president, goes further, clarifying that the Communists uphold a “new project of development with sovereignty and valuing work” (Valor Econômico, July 20, 2007).

Curiously, the Communists decided to break up with the CUT precisely at the moment the Single Central of Workers board has been emphatically stating its differences with regard to various measures taken by the Lula government. There are those who say, precisely because of that, that the CSC decision is indeed related to the contentiousness between the PCdoB and the PT. The Communists want to stay clear of the PT ever since Aldo Rebelo was defeated by Arlindo Chinaglia in the contest for the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies — and subsequently would also have opted for leaving the CUT. Yet, if they indeed manage to create this new central, they might, rather than strengthen “development with sovereignty and valuing work”, further fragment the working class, with gains for the neoliberal sectors acting inside and outside the government.